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THE PARADOX OF THE FRESH
COMPLAINT RULE
KATHRYN M. STANCHI *
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX DEFINED
The fresh complaint rule' creates a paradox 2—although it is meant
to help sexual assault complainants, it may be more harmful than
helpful. The paradox is complicated by recent changes in some courts'
* Visiting Instructor of Legal Writing, Villanova University School of Law. BA., 1987, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, ID., 1990, Boston University. I would like to thank Doris Brogan, Gerry
Abraham and Anne Poulin for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, Christine Vigliotti,
Jennifer Parker and Kristin Palmaccio for their valuable research assistance, and Lynn Steen for
calling my attention to the data on juror decision-making. I also wish to recognize and give special
thanks In illy colleagues in the writing program at Villanova, especially to Jo Anne Durako, Brett
Amdur, Diane Edelman and Rebecca Connelly, who provided not only insightful analytical
critique, but steadfast support and friendship.
I The rule discussed in this article has a variety of names, including fresh complaint, prompt
complaint, first complaint, report of rape rule and complaint of rape rule. I recognize that many
of these terms are archaic and sexist. See The Doctrine of 'Fresh Complaint" in Rape Cases: Hearing
Before the Joint Subcommittee of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice and
Rules of Evidence (1993) (written submissions on file with author) [hereinafter Fresh Complaint
Hearing] (written submission of Leigh B. Bienen, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs,
Princeton University, [hereinafter Bienen Submission] at 3-8). Although I agree with Professor
Bienen that the name should be changed, I use the term "fresh complaint" for clarity in this
Article and suggest a new term at the end of this Article.
2
 "Paradox" is defined as:
I: a tenet contrary to received opinion 2 a: a statement that is seemingly contradic-
tory or opposed to common sense and yet is perhaps true b: a self-contradictory
statement that at first seems true ci an argument that apparently derives self-con-
tradictory conclusions by valid deduction from acceptable premises 3: something
. „ with seemingly contradictory qualities or phases
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 853 (1991).
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articulation and application of the fresh complaint rule because the
changes reduce, without eradicating, the rule's harmful effects. The
paradox has led to considerable disagreement among courts, lawyers
and scholars about whether the rule should be retained.'
The fresh complaint rule is a special evidentiary rule applicable
only in sexual assault trials that permits the prosecution to introduce,
in its case in chief, out-of-court statements made by the complainant
shortly after the assault, alleging that the sexual assault occurred. 4
Because the rule permits admission of fresh complaint evidence in the
prosecution's case in chief, it is an exception to the general evidentiary
policy that prohibits admission of prior consistent statements until
after a witness has been impeached on cross-examination.'
The evidence is admitted in the prosecution's case in chief to
prevent jurors from assuming that the victim did not make an imme-
diate complaint and is therefore lying about the assault, an assumption
I call the "timing myth." 6 The rationale for the rule is that a woman
who was truly sexually assaulted would naturally complain immediately;
fresh complaint evidence is necessary to show that a sexual assault
victim behaved like a "true" victim.? Because of this rationale, only
3 In 1993, the Joint Subcommittee of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Criminal
Practice and Rules of Evidence held a hearing on what to do with the fresh complaint rule. Those
who attended and testified disagreed sharply on whether to retain the fresh complaint rule. See
Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note I. Compare id., supra note 1, Bienen Submission (reluctantly
rejecting the fresh complaint doctrine) and id. (written submission of Zulima V. Farber, Depart-
ment of the Public Advocate, State of New Jersey) (strongly rejecting the fresh complaint doc-
trine) with id. (written submission of Rutgers Women's Rights Litigation Clinic) (arguing to keep
the fresh complaint doctrine) and id. (written submission of Fred DeVesa, Attorney General of
the State of New Jersey) (advocating in favor of retaining fresh complaint rule). See also Morrison
Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions,
24 U.C. awls L. REV. 1013, 1062-71 (1991) (rejecting the fresh complaint doctrine); Dawn M.
DuBois, Note, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOK.
L. REV. 1087, 1109-15 (1988) (arguing to abandon the prompt complaint doctrine); Christine
Kenmore, Note, The Admissibility of Extrajudicial Rape Complaints, 64 B.U. L. REV. 199, 240 (1984)
(rejecting the fresh complaint doctrine).
4 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Licata, 591 N.E.2d 672, 673-75 (Mass. 1992); People v. McDaniel,
611 N.E.2d 265, 268-70 (N.Y. 1993); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 441 A.2d 1327, 1351-32 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982).
5 4 JOHN HENRY WICMORE, EVIDENCE § 1124 Uames H. Chadbourn Revision 1972). Although
some courts characterize the fresh complaint rule as an exception to the hearsay rule, see, e.g.,
McDonald v. State, 578 So. 2d 371, 373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), fresh complaint evidence used
to rebut the inference raised by the alleged silence of the complainant is not hearsay, because it
is not offered for the truth. See Fun, R. Evin. 801.
6 See Torrey, supra note 3, at 1014-15 (introducing the idea and the term "rape myth" to
describe the widely believed stereotypes that unfairly damage the credibility of rape complain-
ants). I use the term "rape myth" throughout this Article to refer to the false stereotypes
surrounding sexual assault and its victims.
7 See, e.g., People v. Harris, 480 N.E.2d 1189, 1196 Oil App. Ct. 1985) (permitting fresh
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complaints made immediately or shortly after the sexual assault are
admissible.'
The paradox arises because the rule is both effective and harmful.
Fresh complaint evidence effectively helps sexual assault complain-
ants recover from credibility damage caused by the timing myth by
preventing jurors from drawing an erroneous conclusion that the
complainant was silent after the assault.' Supporters of the rule argue
that because sexual assault complainants continue to suffer credibility
damage caused by rape myths, it is a mistake to take away a rule that
effectively deals with one of these myths.'" Moreover, the role of fresh
complaint evidence may be pivotal in cases where jurors are likely to
focus on the timing issue either because of the sequence of events
or because the complainant has credibility problems stemming from
stereotypes other than the timing myth."
Despite its positive aspects, the rule has some harmful effects.
Because it counteracts the timing myth by showing that a victim com-
plained promptly, it has the paradoxical effect of reinforcing the tim-
ing myth by giving the jury evidence that equates promptness with
veracity.' 2
 Moreover, the rationale for the rule gives the law's endorse-
complaint evidence on the basis that , it is entirely natural that a rape victim would speak out
regarding it); Commonwealth v. Shade, 363 A.2d 1187, 1189 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (presuming
that a bona fide complaint of rape will be made promptly); Scoggan v. State, 799 S.W.2d 679,
680-81 (Tex. App. 1990) (explaining that a conviction for rape could not rest on the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of a female who failed to make a prompt outcry).
8
 People v. Denny, 608 N.E.2d 1313, 1325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (delay of 24 hours was both
unexplained and too long where complainant went through day at work before telling police of
rape at knifepoint); State v. Evans, 527 N.E.2d 448, 458 (111. App. Ct. 1988) (two-hour delay
excused because of defendant's threats against complainant and her family); State v. Lewis, 803
S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (three-clay-old complaint admissible because justified
by threats against complainant).
9
 State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 377-78 (N J. 1990) (discussing how fresh complaint deals with
jurors who believe timing myth "on their own terms"); Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, Tr.
at 11 (testimony of Appellate Division Judge Sylvia Pressler) (stating to Assistant Prosecutor Julia
L. McClure, "[y]ou like [fresh complaint] because it works"). The effectiveness of fresh complaint
evidence explains the strong support for the rule by the New Jersey Attorney General's Office
and District Attorney's Office. See Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1 (written submission of
Fred DeVesa, Attorney General of the State of New jersey at 3-8) (advocating in favor of retaining
fresh complaint rule); id. (written submission of County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey
at 1-5) (supporting retention of rule).
19 See Battle v, United States, 630 A.2d 211, 220-22 (D.C. 1993); Hill, 578 A.2d at 377-78;
Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1 (written submission of Julia L. McClure, Middlesex County,
NJ., Prosecutor's Office at 1-5).
" See infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text. The complainants most frequently helped
by fresh complaint evidence are minors and acquaintance rape victims.
12 See DuBois, supra note 3, at 1107 (explaining there is a risk of creating in the minds of
jurors the same negative inference of the timing of complaint it seeks to forestall); Fresh Complaint
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ment to the timing myth and treats the testimony of sexual assault
complainants as inherently suspect. The myth-reinforcing effects of the
rule are also aggravated by archaic terms such as "fresh complaint" and
the history of the rule."
The paradox is complicated by a recent evolution in some courts'
articulation of the rule's rationale and application of the freshness
requirement. The evolving rationale renounces the timing myth as
false and unfair, but acknowledges that fresh complaint evidence is
necessary because of widespread belief in the myth." Courts also have
begun to whittle away at the freshness requirement—that a complaint
must be almost immediate to be admissible—by admitting complaints
made after lengthy delays.' 5 These changes in the rule alleviate some
of the harmful myth-reinforcing effects of the original rule.
There is no easy solution to the paradox. Although the rule has
some harmful effects, eradication of all versions of the rule not only
takes away credibility-restoring evidence from complainants who need
it, but also misses the opportunity to use the evolving rationale to
educate attorneys, judges and jurors about the power and prevalence
of the timing myth in rape trials. Instead of abrogating the fresh
complaint rule, therefore, courts should take the more prudent ap-
proach of adopting an interim rule. This intermediate step would
retain the credibility-restoring aspects of the rule while facilitating the
eventual abrogation of the rule by using the evolving rationale to
educate the legal community. To this end, the interim rule should
adopt the evolving rationale, and courts should instruct the jury using
that rationale. Moreover, the interim rule should explicitly permit
admission of prior complaints without a prerequisite of freshness and
eliminate myth-reinforcing terms such as "fresh complaint."
The interim rule is not a perfect solution to the paradox, but
serves the goals of helping rape complainants counteract the timing
myth on a case by case basis while educating the legal community about
the timing myth. Although at some point elimination of the rule may
be not only possible but preferable, until rape cases are free of the
Hearing, supra note 1, Bienen Submission, at 4 (arguing that to admit fresh complaint evidence
may be counterproductive).
13 See Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, Bienen Submission, at 3-7; DuBois, supra note
3, at 1097-1109; Kenmore, supra note 3, at 200-02.
14 See Hill, 578 A.2d at 376-77. The rule is necessary not because the late complainant is
probably lying, but because others believe she might be lying and will only be convinced of her
veracity by proof of prompt complaint. Id. at 377.
15 See Battle, 630 A.2d at 222 (six-week delay did not render complaint inadmissible under
fresh complaint rule); Hill, 578 A.2d at 377-78 (permitting admission of complaint made almost
two months after the alleged rape).
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damaging effects of the timing myth, abrogation of the rule without a
workable substitute is premature.
This Article explores the paradox of the fresh complaint rule,
evaluates the proposed solutions, and suggests a modified rule as an
interim solution. Part II of this Article explores the fresh complaint
rule, from its historical roots in the English common law to its evolu-
tion in the United States, with special attention to the rationale for the
rule, the requirement of freshness, and the standards for the rule's
application. Parts III and IV examine the paradox raised by the need
for and effectiveness of the rule and its concurrent harmful effects.
Part V describes proposed solutions to the paradox and suggests adop-
tion of a modified interim rule.
II. THE FRESH COMPLAINT RULE
The fresh complaint rule has changed significantly over time, and
the changes reflect an evolution in the jurisprudence of sexual assault.
The most significant changes have occurred in the rationale for the
rule and the requirement of freshness. The following sections describe
the rule and chart the evolution in the rationale for the rule, the
erosion of the freshness requirement, and the standards for the rule's
application.
A. The Evolution of the Rationale for the Fresh Complaint Rule
Although the fresh complaint rule can vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction,' 6 the most common version of the rule permits the prose-
cution in a sexual assault case to introduce, in its case in chief, prior
prompt complaints by the alleged victim. 17
 The rationale for the rule
is that fresh complaint evidence is necessary because without it, jurors
will assume that the victim did not complain immediately after the rape
and conclude that her trial testimony charging rape is a recent fabri-
cation.' 8 This may seem like an unlikely assumption until one examines
the history of the fresh complaint rule, which began as a response to
the legal presumption that a sexual assault victim's silence is evidence
of consent. The following sections of the Article describe the history
16 Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, Bienen Submission, at 5 (explaining that some courts
invoke the rule to exclude evidence, others invoke it to include evidence).
17 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Licata, 591 N.E.2d 672, 673-75 (Mass. 1992); People v.
McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d 265, 268-70 (N.Y. 1993); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 441 A.2d 1327,
1331-32 (Pa. Super. Ct, 1982).
1H W1GMORE, supra note 5, § 1135, at 298-99.
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of that presumption and the emergence and evolution of the fresh
complaint rule that was devised to rebut it.
L The Hue and Cry Rationale
The fresh complaint rule evolved from the common-law require-
ment of "hue and cry," which was based on the expectation that victims
of violent crimes would cry out immediately and which required proof
of the details of the victim's prompt complaint as part of the prosecu-
tion's case in chief. 15
 In the mid-1700s, English law eliminated the "hue
and cry" requirement, but the rule continued to be applied in rape
cases," In some jurisdictions in the United States, the hue and cry
requirement emerged in the form of a short statute of limitations for
sexual assault cases. 21
 In other jurisdictions, the hue and cry rule
translated into a presumption that the lack of evidence of an immedi-
ate complaint in sexual assault cases indicated that no sexual assault
had occurred.22
 If the prosecution offered no fresh complaint evi-
dence, the defense could request the court to instruct the jurors to
draw an inference against the complainant." Thus, the fresh complaint
rule emerged to permit the prosecution to rebut the presumption with
evidence that the complainant made a fresh complaint."
Although prior consistent statements, like fresh complaint evi-
dence, are generally inadmissible prior to impeachment, the hue and
cry presumption provided a loophole for the admission of fresh com-
plaint evidence. 25
 Essentially, the victim's silence after the rape, dem-
onstrated by the lack of fresh complaint evidence, is presumed to be
equivalent to a prior inconsistent statement that impeaches the credi-
bility of the complainant. 26
 This rationale is related to the common-law
19 Hill, 578 A.2d at 374; DuBois, supra note 3, at 1089.
20 Hill, 578 A.2d at 374; WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1760, at 240-41; DuBois, supra note 3, at
1089.
21 See TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (West 1993) (requiring rape victims over age
of 18 to inform someone within one year of the alleged offense in order to render uncorroborated
testimony of the victim admissible); see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3105 (1973) (amended
1976) (requiring rape victims to complain to public authorities within three months of the
offense, or for victims under age of 16, within three months after a parent, guardian, or other
competent person learns of offense). The Pennsylvania statute was amended in 1976 to eliminate
the statute of limitations. Id.
22 DuBois, supra note 3, at 1089.
22
 Hig 578 A,2d at 374-75 (citing State v. Thomas, 174 S.W.2d 337, 345 (Mo. 1943)); see
DuBois, supra note 3, at 1096 (citing 1 NEW YORK JURY INsmucrioNs, GRIM. 7.27, at 306 (1983)).
24
 DuBois, supra note 3, at 1089-90.
22 See DuBois, supra note 3, at 1094.
26 WicstonE, supra note 5, § 1135, at 298; see DuBois, supra note a, at 1094 (noting that
admissions by silence were used predominantly to impeach criminal defendants who failed to
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policy that silence in the face of circumstances naturally compelling
speech is a prior inconsistency that justifies rehabilitation by evidence
of prior consistent statements. 27
The presence of the hue and cry presumption remains strong in
courts' articulation of the rationale for the fresh complaint rule. A
comparison of courts' descriptions of the rationale from the earliest
days of fresh complaint to the present reveals the strong presence and
tenacity of the presumption. For example, in 1914, the Supreme Court
of New Mexico articulated the rationale for the fresh complaint rule:
[N] o self-respecting woman, after an outrage of this kind, can
refrain from proclaiming the same to some friend, and from
seeking such aid and comfort as the circumstances will admit
of. If she remains silent, except in exceptional circumstances,
the inference is strong that the outrage was not in fact com-
mitted."
In 1991, seventy-seven years later, the Supreme Court of Illinois
articulated the rationale for the rule almost identically:
[1] t is entirely natural that the victim of forcible rape would
have spoken out regarding it, and the fact that she did not
do so would in effect be evidence of the fact that nothing
violent had occurred."
Thus, the rationale for the fresh complaint rule embodies and
perpetuates what I call the timing myth," the erroneous assumption
that sexual assault is a "circumstance compelling speech" and that it is
natural for those truly sexually assaulted to complain immediately. 3 '
protest their innocence and questioning whether it is appropriate to apply the same standard to
rape victims as to persons accused of crimes).
"See DuBois, supra note a, at 1094. Under the common law, "[the] failure to speak when it
would have been natural to do so [was) in effect an inconsistent statement or self-contradiction,"
WIGNioxv, supra note 5, § 1135, at 298 (failure of witness to have made same assertion in prior
testimony as witness makes at trial is contradictory).
2s State v. Ellison, 144 P. 10, 13 (N.M. 1914).
" People v. Lawler, 568 N.E.2d 895, 901 (III. 1991) (quoting People v. Damen, 193 N.E.2d
25, 30 (Ill. 1963)); see also State v. Calor, 585 A.2d 1385, 1387 (Me. 1991) (fresh complaint
evidence admissible to "forestall the natural assumption that in the absence of a complaint," no
rape occurred) (quoting State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 464 (Me. 1981)); State v. Derail, 489 N.W.2d
371, 375 (S.D. 1992) ("Mt is natural for a woman or child to complain to someone responsible
for her welfare of an outrage of this character, the failure to complain could be urged by the
defense to contradict or discredit her testimony.").
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
31 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1135, at 298; Professor Torrey identified what. I call the timing
myth as a prevalent and harmful falsehood about sexual assault complainants. Torrey, supra note
3, at 1042-43,
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Moreover, the rationale reflects the law's deep distrust of sexual assault
victims because it treats the testimony of sexual assault complainants
as presumptively false. 32
 Because the rationale reinforces myths about
sexual assault and the "nature" of female sexual assault victims, it has
led many to urge abolition of the fresh complaint rule. 33
2. The Evolving Rationale
Recently, a few courts, called upon to reexamine the rationale for
the fresh complaint rule, have found the original rationale no longer
a valid basis for the admission of fresh complaint evidence." Instead
of abrogating the rule, however, these courts have articulated a new
rationale for admission of fresh complaint evidence that departs from
the rape-myth-based hue and cry history of the rule.
The evolving rationale rejects the timing myth as false and the
product of gender stereotypes and rape myths." Courts adopting the
evolving rationale recognize, however, that because of the hue and cry
presumption and the history of rape mythology in sexual assault cases,
jurors may erroneously believe the timing myth and draw an unfair
inference against rape complainants based on it."
The evolving rationale posits that despite the falsity of the original
rationale, the fresh complaint rule remains necessary for a number of
reasons. First, the law has embraced the hue and cry presumption for
so long that jurors will inevitably wonder about the timing of the
complaint if no evidence of a prior complaint is offered. 37
 Moreover,
jurors may hear evidence through the testimony of prosecution wit-
"See Torrey, supra note 3, at 1042 (underpinning of fresh complaint rule is a basic distrust
of the sworn testimony of women); see also WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1135, at 298. Wigmore
describes the rationale for the rule as follows:
Now, when a woman charges a man with a rape ... and the accused denies the act
itself, . . the circumstance that at the time of the alleged rape the woman said
nothing about it to anybody constitutes in effect a self-contradiction. . . . It was
entirely natural, after becoming the victim of an assault against her will, that she
should have spoken out. That she did not, that she went about as if nothing had
happened, was in effect an assertion that nothing violent had been done.
WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1135, at 298.
33
 See, e.g., Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, Bienen Submission, at 7-8; DuBois, supra
note 3, at 1111-15.
34 See People v. Brown, 883 P.2d 949, 950 (Cal. 1994) (fresh complaint rule, as traditionally
defined, no longer provides a sound basis for admission of extrajudicial statements of rape
victims); State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 377-78 (N.J. 1990) (rejecting the rule's traditional justifica-
tion of the -natural" manner of how a woman is expected to act).
"Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 220-22 (D.C. 1993).
36 Battle, 630 A.2d at 220-21; Hill, 578 A.2d at 377-79.
97 See Hill, 578 A.2d at 376-77.
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nesses that raises the issue of whether and when the complainant made
a prior complaint, such as if the complainant testifies to a series of
events that demonstrate foregone opportunities to complain or testi-
mony that indicates that the complainant delayed filing a formal com-
plaint. 38
 In either case, fresh complaint evidence is necessary to repair
unfair damage to the complainant's credibility caused by juror belief
in the timing myth. 39
In Commonwealth v. Licata, for example, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court confronted the question of whether to abolish
the fresh complaint doctrine." In Licata, the complainant met the
defendant at a hotel bar, talked to him for about two hours and
exchanged telephone numbers with him. 4' The complainant accepted
defendant's offer of a ride to her car because it was raining and she
was parked some distance from the bar. 42
 The defendant then raped
the complainant in his car." After she left the defendant's car, the
complainant went straight to her car and drove away; she did not go
to the bar or hotel to ask for help or complain of the attack." While
the complainant was on her way home, a police officer stopped her
for speeding and she told him that she had been rapec1, 4' The police
officer took the complainant to the hospital, where she repeated her
complaint to a nurse. 46
 In upholding the admission of the testimony
of both the police officer and the nurse, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court stated:
We strongly disagree with the notion that a rape victim natu-
rally will complain of an attack soon after it occurs. It is not
difficult to understand a rape victim's reluctance to discuss
with others, particularly strangers, the uncomfortably specific
33 See Brown, 883 P.2d at 950 (admission of prior complaints especially relevant where victim
testifies to a series of alleged sexual offenses over a considerable period of time during which
victim had opportunity to complain but did not); see also Fresh Complaint Heating, supra note 1,
Tr. at 49-50 (testimony of Julia L. McClure, Assistant Prosecutor, Middlesex County) (arguing
that jurors will hear evidence of gaps between the rape and time of complaint through the
testimony of the investigating police officers).
119
 Hill, 578 A.2d at 377.
" 591 N.E.2d 672, 673 (Mass. 1992). Just one year before Licata, the court had criticized the
fresh complaint rule because of the "sexist reasoning behind the theoretical underpinning of the
.. rule." Commonwealth v. Lavalley, 574 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 n.7 (Mass. 1991).
41 Licata, 591 N.E.2d at 673.
92 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
45
 Licata, 591 N.E.2d at 673.
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details of a sexual attack. Additionally, a victim must endure
the "[s]uspicion and disbelief" with which society greets those
who allege sexual assault. . . .
Troubled as we are by a doctrine which has its origins in
outmoded, and invalid sexual myths, we need not embrace
those views to recognize the unfortunate skepticism that ex-
ists as to the truth of allegations of rape where the victim is
perceived as having remained silent. "Whatever may have
been the historical origin of the fresh complaint doctrine, it
should now be seen in relation to the common observation
. that juries tend toward considerable and perhaps inordi-
nate skepticism in rape cases, above all where there is a
suggestion of willingness or acquiescence on the part of.the
victim." Thus, we, continue to perceive a need for the fresh
complaint doctrine. 47
In State v. Hill, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the
continued viability of the fresh complaint rule." In deciding to retain
the fresh complaint rule, the court reasoned:
It is true that the fresh-complaint rule does not necessarily
contradict sexist notions of how a woman should act after she
has been raped, but merely serves to establish that a woman
acted in the "correct" or "natural" manner expected by soci-
ety. Still, our judicial process cannot remove from every juror
all subtle biases or illogical views of the world. The fresh-com-
plaint rule responds to those jurors on their own terms.
. . . Hence, until there is a clearer understanding of the
perception of rape and its women victims, we think that the
better solution is to allow fresh-complaint testimony to be
admitted. 49
47 1d. at 674 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bailey, 348 N.E.2d 746 (Mass. 1976) (other citations
omitted)).
48 578 A.2d 370, 377 (N.J. 1990).
49 1d. at 377-78; see also Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 221 (D.C. 1993). The Battle
court made many of the same points in deciding to retain the 'report of rape" rule:
Modern courts have recognized that society, and jurors, often erroneously believe
that the only normal behavior of a sexual offense victim is to report the offense
almost immediately. There is no reason to conclude that all District of Columbia
jurors are free from such biases. The report of rape rule was designed to confront
jurors' assumptions . . . that if a victim did not report a sexual assault to someone
else, the victim is probably lying about the occurrence of the offense. Thus, 	 the
practical necessity for such evidence exists because persistent and regrettable as-
sumptions about the credibility of the victims of sex crimes still remain.
Battle, 630 A.2d at 221 (citations and footnote omitted).
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The Supreme Court of California articulated a somewhat different
version of the evolving rationale in People v. Brown.5° In Brown, a
twelve-year-old girl testified that her mother's boyfriend had been
sexually abusing her for five years, but that she had not told anyone of
the abuse until five years later when the defendant moved out of her
house.51 The Supreme Court of California held that the complainant's
confidences to her girlfriend and a family friend made five years after
the abuse started were admissible because:
In the absence of evidence of the circumstances under which
the victim ultimately reported the commission of an alleged
offense, the jury in many instances may be left with an in-
complete or inaccurate view of all the pertinent facts. Admis-
sion of evidence of the circumstances surrounding a delayed
complaint, including those that might shed light upon the
reasons for the delay, will reduce the risk that the jury, per-
haps influenced by outmoded myths regarding the "usual"
or "natural" response of victims of sexual offenses, will arrive
at an erroneous conclusion with regard to whether the of-
fense occurred."
The Brown court reasoned that the prior complaint evidence was
relevant because the alleged victim had "testified to a series of
sexual offenses occurring over a period of several years during
which she remained silent," thereby contributing to the likelihood
that jurors would draw an erroneous conclusion about the existence
of prior complaints."
The evolving rationale for the fresh complaint rule evidences an
important change in judicial thinking about sexual assault. Because
courts following the evolving rationale openly and firmly reject the
timing myth and acknowledge that sexual assault complainants have
historically and continue to be unfairly burdened by the timing myth
and other rape myths, the rationale is an important step in the eradi-
cation of rape myths.
B. The Eroding Freshness Requirement
The rationale for the fresh complaint rule is not the only aspect
of the rule that is changing. Traditionally a strict immediacy require-
ment that barred complaints made as soon as one day after the alleged
"883 P.2d 949 (Cal. 1994).
51 Id. at 951-52.
52 Id. at 958.
55 /d. at 960.
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assault,54 the freshness requirement has begun to break down in many
cases, especially those involving youthful victims and threats of vio-
lence. 55
One version of the rule, still retained in Texas, imposes a strict
statutory time limit for rape complaints 5 6 In most jurisdictions, how-
ever, courts have eschewed rigid time requirements in favor of more
flexible "totality of the circumstances" tests that examine whether the
complaint was made at the first "suitable" opportunity, within a reason-
able time, or whether there was an explanation for the delay. 57 Factors
bearing on the reasonableness of the delay include the age of the
complainant, whether the complainant is related to the defendant,
whether complainant lived with the defendant, and whether defendant
threatened the complainant with violence. 58 Notwithstanding the ap-
54
 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1135(c), (d) at 301-2; see also, e.g., State v. Werner, 489 A.2d
1119, 1126 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (to be admissible, complaint must be made at the time of
the attack or relatively soon thereafter); People v. Harris, 480 N.E.2d 1189, 1196 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (complaint made one day after alleged attack not admissible); McDonald v. State, 578 So.
2d 371, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (suggesting that one-hour delay was significant and might
be too long).
55 See e.g., Hunt v. State, 213 So. 2d 664 (Ala. CL App.) (complaint made after nine-month
delay admissible), cert. denied, 213 So. 2d 666 (Ala. 1968); Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211.
222 (D.C. 1993) (six-week delay did not render complaint inadmissible under Fresh complaint
rule because defendant, complainant's mother's boyfriend, threatened to beat complainant if she
complained); State v. Twyford, 186 N.W.2d 545, 548-49 (S.D. 1971) (complaint admissible after
two- to three-month delay because complainant was a minor).
Ss SeeThx. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (West 1993) (requiring a rape victim to report
the offense within one year for a conviction on uncorroborated testimony); see also 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3105 (1973) (amended 1976) (requiring rape victims over the age of 16 to inform
authorities within three months of alleged offense).
57 See Turyford, 186 N.W.2d at 548. The Turyford court stated:
The mere lapse of time occurring after the injury and the time of the complaint is
not the test of the admissibility of the evidence. The rule requires that the complaint
should be made within a reasonable time. The surrounding circumstances should
be taken into consideration in determining what would be a reasonable time in any
particular case.
Id.; see also Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55, 63 (AlaSka Ct. App. 1986) (court requires complaint to be
"recent" but refuses to set "artificial limits" and will admit delayed complaints if delay is ex-
plained); Battle, 630 A.2d at 222 (delay does not render complaint inadmissible if there is an
explanation for it); Harris, 480 N.E.2d at 1196 (complaint must be prompt, but there is no "fixed"
time and delayed complaints admissible if explained by fear, hysteria and emotion); State v. Hill,
578 A.2d 370, 377 (N.J. 1990) (complaint must be made within reasonable time); People v.
O'Sullivan, 10 N.E. 880, 881 (N.Y. 1887) (complaint is admissible if made at the first suitable
opportunity or if there is an explanation for delaying); State v. Stettina, 635 P.2d 75, 77 (Utah
1981) (complaint admissible if complainant makes it while still under the emotional stress
occasioned by the incident).
58 See, e.g., Greenway v. State, 626 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Alaska 1980) (delay excused in light of
defendant's threats against victim and victim's young age); State v. Baker, 610 P.2d 840, 842 (Or.
Ct. App. 1980) (delay excused because defendant was an acquaintance of victim and had threat-
May 1996]	 FRESH COMPLAINT RULE	 453
parent flexibility of the freshness standard, however, many courts ap-
plying the standard considered delays of relatively short duration—a
few hours or days—unreasonable enough to require an explanation. 5°
Complaints made several days or months after the incident were rarely
excused, even in cases involving minors violated by trusted adults. 6°
In People v. O'Sullivan, for example, the seventeen-year-old com-
plainant lived with the defendant, a Roman Catholic priest, as his
domestic servant." Before she lived with the defendant, the complain-
ant had, since childhood, regularly attended services at the defen-
dant's church with her foster parents. 62 The complainant testified that
the defendant came into her room at night and raped her when his
housekeeper, the only other woman living in the house, was away.° The
complainant testified that she continued to go to confession with the
defendant, and that defendant had told her that she would go to hell
if she told anyone about the assault." The complainant did not tell
anyone, including her foster parents, about the assault until eleven
months later, when she confessed to another priest for the first time. 65
Ignoring the evidence that the defendant was not only a religious
authority figure, but also a physically abusive employer, 66 and the effect
this may have had on a young woman who was raised Catholic in his
church, the New York Court of Appeals stated that the eleven-month-
old confession was "too remote" to admit into evidence because
"[t] here was nothing whatever to justify the delay."67
The tests to determine "freshness" have not changed significantly
since O'Sullivan, but the understanding of what is a reasonable time to
complain or a proper justification for delay has changed. With increas-
ened the victim with a gun); State v. Lewis, 803 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (length
of delay justified due to defendant's threats of violence and his demonstration of capability for
acting on threats).
5 1`) See State v. Denny, 608 N.E.2d 1313, 1325 n.8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (delay of 24 hours was
both unexplained and too long where complainant went through day at work before telling police
of rape at knifepoint).
6° O'Sullivan, 10 N.E. at 882 ("absolutely nothing" justified 11-month delay by a 17-year-old
girl raped by her parish Catholic priest with whom she lived as domestic servant); Curtis v. State,
70 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tenn. 1934) (complaint made by 11-year-old daughter 10 months after
alleged rape by father inadmissible because of "unexcused" delay).
si 10 N.E. at 880, 881. The court stated that there was other "more reliable" evidence that
the complainant was 20 years old, but does not elaborate. Id. at 880-81.
62 Id. at 881.
63 Id. at 880.
64 Id. at 882.
65 10 N.E. at 882.
In Id. at 881.
67
 Id. at 882.
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ing frequency, courts are admitting complaints made after lengthy
delays for reasons that formerly may not have justified such a delay. 68
The erosion of the freshness requirement is exemplified by the trend
of cases in Massachusetts, where, prior to 1979, the outer limit for
admission of prior rape complaints was one day. 69
 Between 1979 and
1989, however, Massachusetts courts began to uphold the admission
of complaints made after loiiger delays, but the longest delay permit-
ted was an eighteen-month delay in a case the court described as
"exceptional."7° Between 1992 and 1994, however, the Massachusetts
Court of Appeals upheld the admission of two three-year-old com-
plaints and one twenty-one-month-old complaint.'' Most cases in which
delayed complaints are admitted are those involving young complain-
ants abused by authority figures or complainants threatened with fur-
ther violence if they complain. 72
Following this trend to its logical end, California has abolished the
freshness requirement entirely." In People v. Brown, the Supreme Court
of California held that prior complaint evidence may be essential to
the jury's understanding of the case, regardless of its promptness. 74 The
court held that as long as an alleged victim's disclosure of the offense
is relevant and is not unduly prejudicial, it may be admitted for non-
hearsay purposes under general evidentiary principles, regardless of
when it was made."
68 See, e.g., Greenway v. State, 626 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Alaska 1980) (complaint made by
13-year-old one month after rape admissible because defendant, her stepfather, threatened to kill
her if she complained); Commonwealth v. McKinnon, 630 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993)
(complaint made after 34-month delay by 13-year-old girl admissible because evidence showed
defendant stepfather created "environment of fear and violence."); Commonwealth v, Lanning,
589 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Mass. App. Ct, 1992) (complaint made after three-year delay admissible
where defendant punched complainant and threatened to abuse her younger sister).
See Commonwealth v, Dion, 568 N.E.2d 1172, 1177-78 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); McKinnon,
630 N.E.2d at 793.
70 Dion, 568 N.E.2d at 1177 (involving four-year-old victim of rape by operator of day care
center who threatened to kill victim's family if she told anyone).
71
 Commonwealth v. Fleury, 632 N.E.2d 1230 (Mass. 1994) (21-month delay); McKinnon, 630
N.E.2d at 795 (34-month delay); Lanning, 589 N.E.2d at 323 (three-year delay).
72
 See, e.g., Greenway, 624 P.2d at 1061 (delay excused in light of defendant's threats against
victim and victim's young age); State v. Baker, 610 13.2d 840, 842 (Or. CL App. 1980) (delay
excused because defendant was an acquaintance of victim and had threatened the victim with a
gun); State v. Lewis, 803 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (length of delay justified due
to defendant's threats of violence and demonstration of capability for acting on his threats).
" People v. Brown, 883 P.2d 949, 958-59 (Cal. 1994).
74 Id.
75 M. at 959.
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C. The Standards for Applying the Fresh Complaint Rule
The singular purpose of the fresh complaint rule—rebutting the
inference raised by the alleged silence of or delay by the complain-
ant—led to the development of a set of corollaries unique to fresh
complaint evidence." Although the corollaries were designed to en-
sure fair and proper application of the rule, their complexity and
frequent misapplication has led to confusion about the rule. To guard
against any unfairness caused by misapplication of the corollaries,
some jurisdictions have cautioned trial courts to review fresh complaint
evidence in every case for relevance, probative value, and prejudice."
First, to avoid hearsay and fairness problems, fresh complaint
evidence is not admitted as "substantive" evidence that a rape oc-
curred; rather, courts generally instruct juries that fresh complaint
evidence is relevant only to the complainant's credibility." Because the
evidence is relevant only to the complainant's credibility, the rule
applies only if the complainant testifies at trial and puts her credibility
at issue."
Moreover, to avoid the danger that juries will misuse fresh com-
plaint evidence as evidence that the assault occurred, most courts
admit only the fact that a complaint was made and the timing of the
complaint, but prohibit admission of the details of the complaint. 8°
7° See Commonwealth v. Licata, 591 N.E.2d 672, 675 (Mass. 1992) (court should instruct jury
that fresh complaint evidence is admitted only to rebut the inference raised by the complainant's
silence, not as substantive evidence); State v. Derail, 489 N.W.2d 371, 375-76 (S.D. 1992) (to avoid
hearsay problems, no evidence other than the fact that the" complaint was made, the timing and
the identity of the attacker are admissible).
77 Brown, 883 P,2d at 959; State v, Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 380 (N.J. 1990).
78 See Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 224 (D.C. 1993); Licata, 591 N.E.2d at 675. But
see State v. Bethune, 578 A.2d 364, 369 (N.J. 1990) (fresh complaint evidence admissible only to
negate inference that no complaint made not to bolster complainant's credibility). The distinction
between "substantive" evidence and "credibility" evidence has been rejected by some states and
by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, prior consistent state-
ments offered for rehabilitation after impeachment are admitted as substantive evidence for the
truth. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (1) (B). The Advisory Committee offered two reasons for this rule.
First, if the adverse party opens the door for the statement's admission into evidence, "no sound
reason is apparent why it should not be received generally." FED, R. Evil). 801(d) (1) (B) advisory
committee's note. Second, the jury, practically speaking, would most likely not understand or
ignore a limiting instruction, and thus there is no strong reason for giving one. 4 JAcit B.
WEINSTEIN Se MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, Rule 801 (d)( t)(B) (011 (1995).
WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1136, at 307-11.
88 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lavalley, 574 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 n.4 (Mass. 1991) (noting that
majority of jurisdictions do not permit details of evidence); Devall, 489 N.W.2d at 375-76;
WIGMORE, SUpD2 note 5, § 1136, at 307-11.
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Although most courts state that only the fact that the complaint was
made is admissible, but not the details, some courts explicitly permit
some details of the complaint to be admitted, 8 ' and other courts deny
that details are admissible, but admit them anyway.82 In addition, there
is some disagreement about what evidence constitutes inadmissible
"details" and what parts of the prior statement are admissible." In
People v. Brown, the Supreme Court of California attempted to define
the boundaries of admissible testimony by limiting prior complaint
evidence to the fact and circumstances of the complaint. 84 The court
explained the "circumstances" of the complaint to mean, for example,
whether the complainant was responding to questions or spoke spon-
taneously, the timing of the complaint, and the complainant's mental
and emotional state at the time."
Similarly, although courts may acknowledge the evidentiary policy
against cumulative evidence, which prohibits the introduction of evi-
dence that is repetitive or unnecessary, 86
 they frequently permit a
number of witnesses, in addition to the complainant, to testify about
fresh complaints. 87 In State v. Hill, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
elaborated on this corollary by instructing the trial courts to assess
whether duplicative fresh complaint testimony was irrelevant or preju-
dicial to the defense, especially "in close cases in which the victim's
complaint has already been once established and it appears that re-
peated fresh-complaint testimony would leave the jury with the impres-
81 See Licata, 591 N.E.2d at 674-75 (Massachusetts permits the admissibility of the details of
a fresh complaint to give the jury the maximum amount of information with which to assess
credibility); State v, Lewis, 803 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (permitting admissibility
of details of victim's complaint when made within a reasonable time).
82 See Licata, 591 N.E.2d at 675 n.8 (listing jurisdictions that prohibit details but frequently
admit them); see also Bethune, 578 A.2d at 368-69 (permitting details of fresh complaint testimony
because testifying witness was cross-examined vigorously and testimony would have been admis-
sible under tender-years exception to hearsay rule); State v. Campbell, 705 P.2d 694 (Or. 1985).
83
 For example, controversy exists as to the admissibility of the complainant's identification
of the attacker in the statement. Compare D.G. v. State, 754 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Alaska CL App. 1988)
(victim's identification of the assailant was not admissible) with Commonwealth v. Stohr, 522 A.2d
589, 593 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (identification of defendant properly admitted as part of the
evidence to identify the occurrence complained of with the offense charged).
84 883 P.2d 949, 959-60 (Cal. 1994).
85 Id. at 950-51.
86 See FED. R. Evil:). 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence); WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1124,
at 255 (statements not made more trustworthy by any number of repetitions of it).
87 See, e.g„ Commonwealth v. Lavalley, 574 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Mass. 1991) (five witnesses);
State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 373 (N J. 1990) (three witnesses).
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sion that the State has gathered a greater number of witnesses than
the defense."88
Finally, in addition to the freshness requirement for admissibility,
in most jurisdictions fresh complaint evidence is permitted only if the
complainant spoke "voluntarily" and not in response to questions. In
an attempt to clarify the meaning of "voluntariness," the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in Hill underscored the difference between state-
ments made in response to noncoercive questioning, which are admis-
sible, and those "procured by pointed, inquisitive, coercive interro-
gation," which are not. 89 Although the court left the trial courts to
determine the coerciveness of the questioning, 9° it listed several factors
relevant to the determination: the victim's age, the circumstances of
the interrogation, the victim's relationship with the interrogator, and
the type and specificity of the questions.`' [ In People v. Brown, the
Supreme Court of California eliminated the voluntariness require-
ment, reasoning that voluntariness, like freshness, should not be an
essential prerequisite to admissibility. 92 The court stated that the admis-
sibility of fresh complaint evidence should not
turn invariably upon whether the victim's complaint was
made immediately following the alleged assault or was pre-
ceded by some delay, nor upon whether the complaint was
volunteered spontaneously. Rather, these factors simply are to
be considered among the circumstances of the victim's report
or disclosure that are relevant in assisting the trier of fact in
assessing the significance of the victim's statements in con-
junction with all of the other evidence presented."
To ensure that the jury understands and uses fresh complaint
evidence properly, most courts give an instruction that outlines for the
jury the purpose and proper use of the evidence. 94 In those jurisdic-
88 578 A.2d at 380.
89 Id. at 379.
9°The court noted that the line ... between noncoercive questioning and coercive ques-
tioning depends on the circumstances of the interrogation" and left to the trial courts to
determine, on a case by case basis, "when that line is crossed." Id.
91 Id. at 379. The court also recognized that a different standard should apply to cases
involving children. State v. Bethune, 578 A.2d 364, 367-68 (NJ. 1990).
92 883 P.2d 949, 951 (Cal. 1994).
93 Id. at 959.
94
 See NEW JERSEY INST. OF LEGAL. EDUC. Se NEW JERSEY EAR ASSN, NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON FRESH COMPLAINT (approved Mar. 19, 1990) thereinafter NJ. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS] (fresh complaint evidence is admitted "to prevent you from making a false
458	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 37;441
dons with the evolving rationale, however, the jury is often given an
instruction that does not reflect the evolving rationale. In New Jersey,
for example, the instructions on fresh complaint read:
The law recognizes that it would be natural for you to assume
that a person subjected to unlawful sexual act(s) would com-
plain within a reasonable time ...
As a result, . . . the State is permitted to introduce evidence
that some complaint was made . . . to prevent you from mak-
ing a false assumption about whether or not the complaint
was made.95
Thus, even in jurisdictions following the evolving rationale, the jury
may remain ignorant of the true purpose of the evidence, which is
to prevent unfairness to the complainant because of the timing
myth . 96
In some respects, the fresh complaint rule has evolved consider-
ably from its early history. Nevertheless, the corollaries to the rule have
remained largely the same. The uneven evolution of the rule has
complicated the paradox of the rule by eradicating some of the prob-
lematic parts of the rule without entirely curing its myth-reinforcing
effects.
III. THE ROLE OF FRESH COMPLAINT
EVIDENCE IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
The paradox of the fresh complaint rule arises in part because the
rule plays a pivotal role in sexual assault trials by restoring the credi-
bility of sexual assault complainants damaged by the timing myth.
There is a real need for fresh complaint evidence because although
there is no empirical support for the timing myth, and there is evi-
dence that contradicts it, it remains widely believed. Fresh complaint
assumption about whether or not the complaint was made, Such evidence is not proof that the
sexual act occurred and is not proof that the witness is telling the truth."); MAssActiust.-rrs
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE IN THE DISTRICT COURT (1988), Instruction 4.13 ("Testi-
mony reporting statements made by the victim of a (rape) (sexual offense) shortly after the
incident is admitted to corroborate that the victim did promptly complaint bid . . . Such
testimony is not admitted to prove that the (rape) (sexual offense) occurred."); see also Battle v.
United States, 630 A.2d 211, 224 (D.C. 1993) (trial court should instruct jury on limited purpose
of evidence); Bethune, 578 A.2d at 369 (trial court should make clear to jury that fresh complaint
does not bolster victim's credibility or prove truth of underlying charges, but merely dispels
inference of silence).
N CI. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 94, at 1-2.
" See supra notes 34-53 and accompanying text (describing the evolving rationale for rule).
May 1996]	 FRESH COMPLAINT RULE	 459
evidence effectively deals with the timing myth by rebutting the factual
premise underlying the myth. Moreover, the role of fresh complaint
evidence can be pivotal in cases where the timing myth is especially
damaging, such as cases where the complainant has additional credi-
bility problems stemming from stereotypes other than the timing myth.
In these cases, fresh complaint evidence restores part of the complain-
ant's unfairly damaged credibility.
A. The Need for Fresh Complaint Evidence
Despite the absence of evidence linking timing with veracity and
ample evidence demonstrating that delay in formal reporting is caused
by factors other than veracity,97 belief in the timing myth remains
prevalent and the absence of a prior complaint is likely to affect
adversely the complainant's credibility." Fresh complaint evidence
counteracts the effects of the timing myth.
1. The Falsity of the Timing Myth
There is no empirical evidence supporting the presumption un-
derlying the timing myth, and there is evidence that contradicts it.
Studies show that anywhere from twelve percent to twenty-five percent
of sexual assault complainants delay reporting to the authorities, a
percentage that is significantly lower than the percentage of false
sexual assault reports, which is estimated at about two percent." More-
over, delay has been linked to a number of factors that have nothing
to do with veracity. For example, adult sexual assault complainants
delay because they fear no one will believe them, or because they feel
97 Delay is associated with, among other things, the effect of rape myths on adult report-
ing and fear and conflicting emotions in minor victims. See infra notes 99-116 and accompany-
ing text.
98
 Thus, the concerns articulated by courts in the evolving justification kir the fresh complaint
rule are valid. See State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 570,376-78 (N.J. 1990).
99 In a 1992 report, for example, the National Victim Center and Crime Victims Research
and Treatment Center stated that of the 16% of rape victims who report, 25% wait 24 hours or
longer to complain. NATIONAL VICTIM CTR, & CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH & TREATMENT CTR.,
RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 5,6 thl. 7 (1992) (hereinafter RAPE IN AMERICA].
Another study found that of those women who reported to police, 72% reported within 30
minutes, 8% within one hour, 7% within three hours and 12% more than three hours. MARTIN
GREENBERG & R. BARRY RUBACK, AFTER THE: CRIME: VICTIM DECISION MAKING 145-46 (1992).
By contrast, social scientists estimate false rape reporting at about 2%. SEuitI,I.E 1CAT7, & MARY
ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 208-09
(1979) (citing C.J. Hursch & J. Selkin, Rape Prevention Research Project, Annual Report of the
Violence Research Unit, Division of Psychiatric Service, Department of Health and Hospitals,
Denver (1974)).
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embarrassed or guilty about the sexual assault. For minor victims, delay
is associated with, among other things, fear of the perpetrator, love and
respect for a family or friend perpetrator, and fear that they will not
be believed.m
Delay in adult victims is a reflection of rape mythology, not verac-
ity."' Complainants who perceive themselves to have a weak or uncon-
vincing case, for example, delay in their complaints of sexual assault
and are likely not to make a formal complaint at all. 102
 What complain-
ants consider a "weak" sexual assault case is fueled by rape myths."'
Victims are more likely to report "classic rapes" 144—sudden, violent
attacks by a stranger that result in serious physical injury. 105
 Sexual
assault victims hesitate to report nonstranger sexual assault because
they are more likely to feel responsible for it. 106
 Feelings of responsi-
bility for the sexual assault are rooted in the rape myth that victims
provoke sexual assault and could prevent sexual assault if they really
wanted to. 1 D7
Complainants also wait longer to report when they have not em-
ployed verbal strategies, such as talking, screaming or crying, during
100 See Veronica Serrato, Note, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum
of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REV. 155, 159-61 (1988) (discussing that common emotional reactions to sexual
abuse includes fear for safety, fear of future sexual abuse and fear of family's response to learning
of the abuse, all leading to significant delays in disclosure). Delay has never, however, been
correlated to mendacity.
101 See Torrey, supra note 3, at 1025. Professor Torrey lists four "classic" rape myths: ( 1 ) only
women with "bad" reputations are raped; (2) women are prone to sexual fantasies about rape;
(3) women precipitate rape by their appearance and behavior; and (4) women, motivated by
revenge, blackmail, jealousy, guilt, or embarrassment falsely claim rape after consenting to sexual
relations. Id. All of these myths are false. See id. at 1025-31.
l 02 See infra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
1
'93
 See Torrey, supra note 3, at 1025-31; see also Mary P. Koss et al., Stranger and Acquaintance
Rape: Are There Differences in the Victim's Experience?, 12 PSYCHOI.. WOMEN Q. 1, 2-3 (1988).
104 Linda S. Williams, The Classic Rape: When Do Victims Report?, 31 SOC. PROBS. 459, 461-62,
464 (1984). This study was an analysis of 246 rape complaints reported to a trained intake
volunteer of Seattle Rape Relief and the data collected on the organization's Contact Sheet.
105 Id. at 460, 464-65. The difference in reporting rates between stranger and nonstranger
rape is directly related to the acceptance of rape mythology by both women and men. The "classic
rape" is a myth to the extent that it suggests that most rapes are perpetrated by a stranger, rather
than by someone the victim knows and trusts. RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 99, at 4 (only 22%
of all rapes are stranger rapes). Nevertheless, victims of stranger rape are more likely to report
than other victims because they are better able to convince themselves and others that they are
truly crime victims. Alan J. Lizotte, The Uniqueness of Rape: Reporting Assaultive Violence to the
Police, 31 CRIME DELINQ. 169, 173 (1985); Williams, supra note 104, at 464.
1 °6 See Koss et al., supra note 103, at 2-3; Williams, supra note 104, at 461 (women less likely
to see themselves as rape victims if they were well-acquainted with their attackers).
107 See Torrey, .supra note 3, at 1025-26, 1039-40 (documenting social belief in myth that
women provoke rape and are raped only if they do not resist strongly enough).
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the sexual assault." In another study, complainants who felt guilt
based on their perception that they complied in or otherwise invited
the sexual assault or seduced the rapist, waited several days or weeks
to report, whereas women who felt no guilt made immediate reports."
This correlates to the rape myth that victims provoke sexual assault by
their behavior, such as flirting or getting a man sexually excited and
then refusing to have intercourse,"° that only "bad girls" are sexually
assaulted, and that they deserve it."' Race also is a factor that can affect
timing."2 One study showed that complainants report to the police
more promptly when the alleged attacker is black.' 15 This correlation
calls to mind the rape myth that most sexual assaults are committed
by black men against white women. 114
Delay by victims who are minors is similarly correlated with fac-
tors other than veracity. A very young victim may not under-
stand what happened or have the vocabulary to describe it or may
be threatened or otherwise within the control of the perpetrator,
who may be a relative or other trusted authority figure."' Minor vic-
1°8 GREENBERG & RUBACK, supra note 99, at 146.
"'Sandra Sutherland & Donald Scherl, Patterns of Response Among Victims of Rape, 40 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 503, 505 (1970). In this study, the response patterns of 13 white, female
victims, aged 18-24 years, were studied by a mental health team. Id.
"a Torrey, supra note 3, at 1024-25.
it' Id. at 1025.
112 GREENBERG & RUBACK, supra note 99, at 140, 146.
113 Id. at 146. Moreover, of those allegedly raped by black men, white women report more
promptly than black women. Id.
114 See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087, 1087 (1986) (describing her encounter with
police after her rape, where police expressed relief and seemed to find her more believable when
she told them her assailant was black—or as they put it, a "crow"); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 599-601 (1990) (rape signifies
terrorism of black men by white men, aided and abetted by white women "crying rape").
t° See State v. Bethune, 578 A.2d 364, 366-68 (N.J. 1990) (recognizing need for flexibility in
sexual assault cases involving children who may be frightened and embarrassed or may have no
clear understanding of what happened); see also Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The
Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CauDozo L. REV.
2027, 2033 (explaining that a child's cognitive and verbal abilities may not enable her to give
consistent and detailed reports of her sexual abuse). Furthermore, Dr. Roland Stimmitt has
classified the reactions of the sexually abused child into various categories: stage one consists of
secrecy, when the defendant makes it clear to the child that it would be bad or dangerous for
the child to tell anyone about the sexual abuse. Id, at 2036-37 (citing Roland Summiu, The Child
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983)). Stage two is helplessness,
when the child fears that no one will be able to protect him or her from retaliation by the abuser
or fears being blamed for the incident. Id. In addition, sexual abusers are often a parent or
relative, people in positions of trust and authority of the child's world. Susan M. Basham, Note,
Forging the Causal Link: Reasonable Delay in Commencing Action for Childhood Sexual Abuse, 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 749, 750 (1993). It has been estimated that 24-50% of sexual abuse offenders
are family members. Joy Lazo, Comment, True or False: Expert Testimony on Repressed Memory, 28
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Urns may also remain silent because of fear that no one will believe
them."6
2. Belief in the Timing Myth
Notwithstanding the empirical data, belief in the timing myth
continues to be prevalent and affects society's view of the credibil-
ity of sexual assault complainants. In a study on attitudes toward
rape, forty-one percent of the persons studied agreed with the as-
sertion that "[a] charge of rape two days after the act has oc-
curred is probably not rape."'" Similarly, belief in the timing myth
is evident from judicial decisions," 8 scholarly legal writings," 9 re-
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (1995) (citing Rayline A. Devine, Sexual Abuse of Children: An
Overview of the Problem, in U.S. DEPT' OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN:
SELECTED READINGS 3, 5 (Barbara M. Jones et al. eds., 1980)).
" 6 See Serrato, supra note 100, at 192 n.24 (citing Roland Summitt, The Child Abuse Accom-
modation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 181-82 (1983)) (majority of victims never
tell anyone about the abuse as children out of fear and a sense of blame); see also JOHN E.B.
MYERS, LEGAL. ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 134-39 (1992) (stating that many victims
of child sexual abuse never disclose their abuse).
117
 HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAW 50-51, Table 3-1 (1980).
118 See, e.g., People v. Lawler, 568 N.E.2d 895, 901 (Ill. 1991); State v. Werner, 489 A.2d 1119,
1126 (Md. Gt. Spec. App. 1985) (failure of sex offense victim to complain at the time of the crime
or shortly thereafter "would weigh heavily against the state"); State v. Der-all, 489 N.W.2d 371, 375
(S.D. 1992) ("Since it is natural for a woman or child to complain to someone responsible for
her welfare of an outrage of this character, the failure to complain could be urged by the defense
to contradict or discredit her testimony.").
L 19 See Russell M. Coombs, Reforming New Jersey Evidence Law on Fresh Complaint of Rape, 25
RUTGERS U. 699, 712 & n.70 (1994) [hereinafter Coombs, Reforming N.J. Evidence Law]; Fresh
Complaint Hearing, supra note 1 (written submission of Russell M. Coombs, Associate Professor,
Rutgers University School of Law–Camden). Despite Professor Coombs's knowledge of the em-
pirical data on rape reporting (and the lack of data linking timing and veracity), his "logic,"
"common sense" and "lay knowledge of human behavior" lead him to the conclusion that delay
evidence is relevant both to show that the complainant is lying and that the rape did not occur.
Coombs, Reforming N.J. Evidence Law, supra, at 720. Professor Coombs rejects the empirical
studies of rape complainant behavior because most (if not all) of the data is obtained by victim
self-reports—and therefore assumes that the polled complainant is telling the truth about the
rape. See id. at 720 n.I03. Because there is no empirical data linking timing of a rape complaint
with veracity, however, the issue becomes what the better standard is for a rule of evidence: the
data we do have or Professor Coombs's "lay knowledge of human behavior." See Sherry F. Colb,
Assuming Facts Not in Evidence: A Response to Russell M. Coombs, Reforming New Jersey Evidence
Law on Fresh Complaint of Rape, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 745, 748-50 (1994) (arguing that one must have
a hypothesis about how an actual rape victim would respond to rape in order to interpret the
relevance of delay). Professor Coombs's lay knowledge" about the significance of the timing of
rape complaints seems a poor substitute for empirical evidence when: (I) reasonable minds may
and do differ on the meaning of timing in rape cases (that is, the "lay knowledge" varies widely
between people); (2) in the area of sexual assault, "lay knowledge" may reflect stereotypes about
rape victims and women's nature, see infra note 132 and accompanying text; and (3) the
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ports in the media, 12" and the history of the fresh complaint rule
itself 121
The perseverance of the timing myth and other rape myths in the
face of evidence to the contrary can be attributed to what psycholo-
gists call "cognitive inflexibility. "122 Cognitive inflexibility means that
although individuals can learn new information, they will interpret that
information through the filter of their personal beliefs and biases. 123
Sometimes this means that new information will be disregarded be-
cause it conflicts with a strongly held belief.'" The basis of the timing
myth is the cognitive structure or intuitive assumption, strongly rooted
in the law, that people wronged will seek justice. 125 The empirical
evidence about the timing and reasons for sexual assault reports con-
tradicts the intuitive notion of human nature that forms the basis for
the traditional fresh complaint rule.' 26 This contradiction might ex-
plain the tenacity of the timing myth.
Although intuitive notions of human behavior form the basis of
many rules of evidence other than the fresh complaint rule,' 27 using
such assumptions to make rules of evidence for a crime such as sex-
ual assault is problematic. First, grafting onto sexual assault jurispru-
empirical evidence we do have contradicts Professor Coombs's lay knowledge." That Professor
Coombs chooses to reject the empirical data wholesale rather than re-examine the validity of his
logic in light of the empirical data testifies to the tenacity of the timing myth. See Colb, supra, at
754; see also supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
1 "Failure to complain is often equated with consent. In 1992, the Miami Herald reported
that prosecutors decided not to Ole rape charges against three New York Mets largely because of
the complainant's 11-month delay in making a formal complaint. Christine Evans & Peter Slevin,
State Drops Rape Case Against Three N.Y. Mets Prosecutors Cite Shortage of Evidence, MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 10, 1992, at IA (quoting prosecutor Bruce Colton characterizing the situation as a "date
rape situation"). Similarly, Anita Hill was widely disbelieved for her failure to conic forward
promptly. See Richard L. Berke, The Thomas Nomination: Thomas's Accuser Assails Handling of
Her Complaint, N.V. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al (comments of Sen. Strom Thurmond); see also
Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the
Revision of Truth, 37 N,Y.L. Scut. L. Rev. 123, 128-33 (1992) (explaining that the senators'
emphasis on Anita Hill's delay in complaining about sexual harassment reflected the common
bias of the public that a woman who delays complaining is likely to be a liar).
121 See supra notes 19-53 and accompanying text.
122 See Torrey, supra note 3, at 1050.
' 25 1d, at 1050. Those personal beliefs are called cognitive structures.
324 Id.
125 See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text; see also Colb, supra note 119, at 751
(explaining erroneous belief in timing myth by acknowledging common belief that when some-
thing upsetting happens, we expect that the natural human response is to complain).
126 See State v. Werner, 489 A.2d 1119, 1126 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (stating that fresh
complaint rule is "founded upon the laws of human nature, which induces a female thus outraged
[by rape] to complain at the first opportunity") (quoting Legore v. State, 41 A. 60 (Md. 1898)).
127 See Fen. R. Evil). 803(2) (excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule); FED. R. Evil).
804(b) (3) (statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule).
464	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 37:441
dente the general assumption that the natural reaction of true vic-
tims is to complain immediately does not consider that the unique
qualities of sexual assault might warrant a different assumption.'"
Second, what I have been calling an intuitive assumption about hu-
man nature began as a reflection of how men believed men should
respond to violence, without considering that women might behave
differently,' 29
 and turned into an assumption that reflected how men
believed women 13° should act.' 3 ' Because intuitive assumptions about
human behavior, especially female behavior, are likely to be biased by
ignorance or stereotypes in the context of sexual assault, they are not
an appropriate basis for a rule of evidence applicable only to sexual
assault cases, such as the fresh complaint rule.' 32
128 See Colb, supra note 119, at 752 (expectation that sexual assault victims will complain
immediately underestimates countervailing forces that operate on rape victims to suppress oth-
erwise common inclination to talk about one's pain). Sexual assault, especially by an acquaintance
of the victim, is one of the most difficult crimes to prosecute successfully in large part because
of the myths that surround sexual assault and its victims. See Torrey, supra note 3, at 1057-62.
These myths make rape different from other violent crimes because they cause jurors unfairly to
regard rape complainants with skepticism and cause rape victims to avoid or hesitate telling
someone of the rape. See id.; supra notes 101-14; see also Deborah W. Denno, Panel Discussion:
Men, Women, and Rape, 63 FOROHAM L. REV. 125,127-33 (1994) (explaining that rape is unique
due to the shame, stigma, and resulting psychological harm, as well as myths that plague it, in
addition to the fact that rape involves an overwhelming number of male perpetrators on female
victims); Estrich, supra note 114, at 1090-93 (explaining the many ways rape is different from
other crimes, such as the courts' focus almost entirely on the victim, a male standard is used to
judge the conduct of women victims, and it is the only crime where the victim must physically
resist to show nonconsent); Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond
Rape, 93 CoLum. L. REV. 1442,1448-49 (1993) (describing rape as sui genesis, a primal experience
that cannot be reduced to other painful experiences, such as theft).
X29 Women got left out of the equation; to the extent women were considered at all, they
were assumed to behave like men. See WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1129, at 270-71 (root of fresh
complaint rule is general evidentiary policy that people will cry out in response to crime).
13°Although both men and women can be sexually assaulted, cases following the traditional
justification specifically make assumptions about women's nature. See People v. Damen, 193
N.E.2d 25,30 (III. 1963) (it is natural for a woman to speak out regarding a forcible rape); State
v. Devall, 489 N.W.2d 371,375 (S.D. 1992) (stating that it is natural for a woman to complain).
The assumption is probably flawed as applied to male rape victims as well, however, because they
are likely to be susceptible to similar feelings of guilt and stigmatization that women victims are.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 499 N.E.2d 1229,1231 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (male victim
of rape by another male delayed almost one month before complaining); Commonwealth v.
Bailey, 510 A.2d 367,367-68 (Pa. 1986) (two-day delay of victim's complaint after father raped
his son); Denno, supra note 128, at 127 n.10 (noting that there is compelling evidence that men
suffer as much psychological and physical harm as a result of sexual harassment as do women);
Estrich, supra note 114, at 1089 n.1 (noting that apparent invisibility of male rape may reflect
the intensity of the stigma attached to the crime and the homophobic reactions against its
victims).
131 See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of hue and cry from
rule applicable to all criminal cases to rule applicable only to sexual assault cases).
132 Thus, one commentator's suggestion that "logic, common sense and lay knowledge of
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B. The Role of Fresh Complaint Evidence:
Filling the Void for Sexual Assault Complainants
Because of the falsity and prevalence of the timing myth, there is
a real need for evidence that deals with the damaging effects of the
myth. Fresh complaint evidence fulfills this need. It effectively coun-
teracts the timing myth because it demonstrates that the factual prem-
ise upon which the timing myth is based does not exist in a particular
case. Moreover, fresh complaint evidence plays an especially important
role in cases where the complainant's credibility is both central to the
case and susceptible to unfair skepticism because of rape myths.
1. Counteracting the Timing Myth
Fresh complaint evidence attacks the underlying factual compo-
nent of the timing myth: the inference that no sexual assault occurred
because the complainant did not complain promptly or within a rea-
sonable time after the claimed sexual assault. The rationale of the fresh
complaint rule is that if no evidence of fresh complaint is admitted,
jurors will assume that no complaint was made and will conclude that
the complainant is lying.'" By showing the assumption that no com-
human behavior" provides a better basis for an evidentiary rule than the empirical data on rape
reporting must be rejected. See Coombs, Reforming NJ, Evidence Law, supra note 119, at 720. The
result of a subjective, "common sense" relevance standard, as illustrated by the justification for
the traditional fresh complaint rule, is that women who fail to behave the way men expect men
to behave or the way men expect women to behave are presumed to be lying. Although the rule
would disproportionately impact women, women (as opposed to men's view of women) are not
considered in the determination of the rule, nor does it consider that women's behavior might
differ from men's expectations. Moreover, when the question posed is how would we (men)
expect women to respond to the crime of rape, the result is distorted by the stereotypes and
myths that surround both women's "nature" and sexual assault. See id.; see also Torrey, supra note
3, at 1041-45; supra notes 117-26 (discussing tenacity of timing myth in face of empirical data).
1 " See State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 376-78 (NJ. 1990) (explaining rationale for fresh complaint
rule). Another rationale for admission of fresh complaint evidence is that the jury is likely to
hear about the timing of the formal complaint from police witnesses or will otherwise draw
inferences from the sequence of events. See Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, Tr. at 49-50
(testimony of Julia L. McClure, Assistant. Prosecutor, Middlesex County), The likelihood that
jurors will draw a negative inference based on the absence of fresh complaint evidence is substan-
tial. One study of juror decision-making posits that jurors take the evidence presented to them
at trial and construct a story with it. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in
Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PYSCHOL. 242, 243 (1986). if a story con-
structed by a juror is missing a component, the juror will infer that component, based on, among
other things, the juror's beliefs regarding "general truths about what generally happens in the
world." Id. at 247, 252. Thus, if no fresh complaint evidence is admitted, jurors are likely to make
an inference about the circumstances of the complaint based on their personal beliefs. See id.
These personal beliefs are likely to be influenced by rape myths, including the timing myth. See
supra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
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plaint was made to be untrue, fresh complaint evidence prevents the
jury from inferring that the complainant is lying.
The eroding freshness requirement has some impact on the rule's
effectiveness because it permits admission of delayed complaints,
which may give the jury additional reasons to disbelieve the complain-
ant. Nevertheless, evidence of a delayed complaint may be of value
because it prevents the jury from assuming that the complainant made
no prior complaint or from wondering about the circumstances of
prior complaints.' 34 Moreover, admitting the circumstances of the com-
plaint in addition to the timing of it permits the complainant to
explain the reasons for the delay, which not only derails the assump-
tion that the complainant is lying but also educates the jurors about
the reasons sexual assault complainants may hesitate to report.
2. Dealing with Credibility Damage in "Hard" Cases
Although fresh complaint evidence is necessary in all sexual as-
sault trials because of the pervasive timing myth and the history of the
"hue and cry," the role of the fresh complaint rule can be critical in
cases where the complainant's credibility is both central to the case
and susceptible to unfair skepticism because of the timing myth and
other rape stereotypes. A significant number of these cases involved
complainants who were minors or adolescents,'" complainants who
were romantically involved with the alleged attacker, or complainants
who did not behave consistently with societal expectations. 196 Rebuttal
of the timing myth is essential in these cases because these types of
complainants are (i) more likely to delay for reasons unrelated to
veracity and (ii) more likely to be harmed by the absence of fresh
complaint evidence due to their other credibility problems. Moreover,
in child sexual abuse cases, the minor complainant will often testify to
a series of sexual assaults occurring over a period of time during which
the complainant did not complain.'" In these cases, jurors are likely
154 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., D.C. v. State, 754 P.2d 1128, 1128 (Alaska Gt. App. 1988) (nine-year-old victim);
Battle v. United States, 730 A.2d 211, 213 (D.C. 1993) (14-year-old victim); People v. Duplessis,
618 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (14-year-old victim); Commonwealth v. Fleury, 632
N.E.2d 1230, 1231 (Mass. 1994) (eight-year-old victim); State v. Bethune, 578 A.2d 364, 365 (N.J.
1990) (five-year-old victim); People v McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d 265, 267 (N.Y 1993) (11-year-old
victim); Bailey, 510 A.2d at 367 (nine-year-old victim).
' 56 The characteristics of complainants in fresh complaint cases bear striking resemblance to
the characteristics of complainants who delay complaining, See supra notes 99-116 and accom-
panying text.
°7
	 People v. Brown, 883 P.2d 949, 958 (Cal. 1994) (seven-year-old testified that mother's
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to hear about a delay in complaining or are likely to notice the absence
of a prior complaint because of the testimony or the complainant's
other credibility problems. Fresh complaint evidence is necessary in
these cases to restore the part of the complainant's credibility unfairly
damaged by the timing myth.
For example, in State v. Devall, T.L., a college student, and Devall
met after midnight at a bar during a homecoming celebration.'" T.L.
and Devall talked for about twenty minutes and kissed and held
hands.'" They then left the bar, stopped at another bar, and began to
walk to a fraternity party."° During the walk, T.L. and Devall kissed.' 41
Devall then unbuttoned T.L.'s pants, but she said "no" and refastened
them. 142 Devall then yanked her pants to the ground, pinned her arms
behind her back, and raped her. 143 After raping her, Devall told her to
put her pants on and pulled her toward his friend's apartment.'" The
court noted that T.L. did not scream for help during the rape or on
the way to the friend's aparonent. 149 When they reached the apartment,
T.L. lay down in one of the bedrooms. 196
 Although two people she knew
were at the apartment, T.L. did not tell them about the rape. 147 After
thirty minutes, Devall came in, told T.L. to leave, grabbed her arm and
pulled her to the door. 148 She left, met a friend and told her about the
rape. 149 Approximately twenty-four hours later, upon her friends' urg-
ing, T.L. reported the rape to the police.'"
In this case, evidence of T.L.'s discussions with her friends served
to counteract some of the credibility damage caused by T.L.'s story,
especially because the jury might have perceived her failure to corn-
live-in boyfriend sexually abused her for five years but that she did not tell anyone until boyfriend
moved out).
138 State v. Devall, 489 N.W.2d 371, 373 (S.D. 1992).
139 Id.
140 id.
' 4 ' Id.
142 Id. ; see .supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (describing rape myth that women who
flirt or begin sexual activity and then refuse to have sex have not been raped or asked for it).
' 45 Deval4 489 N.W.2d at 373.
t44
145 Id.; see supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (describing rape myth that rape victims
who did not scream or otherwise resist were not raped).
146 Devaii, 489 N.W.2d at 373.
147 1d.
148 Id.
1491d .
150 id at 374. T.L. testified that she did not go to the police earlier because she did not believe
that they would treat her fairly. Id.
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plain on the way or at Devall's friend's apartment as evidence that she
was not really raped.' 5 ' Other fresh complaint cases show that fresh
complaint evidence plays a similarly important role.' 52
3. The Educational Role of the Evolving Rationale
In addition to performing a critical function in sexual assault
trials, the evolving justification for the fresh complaint rule serves an
educational purpose by openly acknowledging and giving judicial voice
to the powerful negative impact the timing myth and other rape myths
have on sexual assault trials.'" The open discussion of the timing myth
and other rape myths in judicial opinions is important because of the
educational effect it has on the legal community—especially other
judges and attorneys.' 54
 That the timing myth has persevered after
twenty years of contrary empirical data testifies to the need for depro-
gramming in the legal arena.'"
]51
 T.L.'s failure to scream or complain about the rape despite opportunities to do so is
mentioned twice in the majority opinion in DevalL Id. at 373. The prominence of these facts
suggests that the Supreme Court of South Dakota, and perhaps the courts below, believed that
T.L.'s failure to complain reflected negatively on her credibility. See id. jurors may make a similar
assumption. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 133, at 243, 254 (positing that jurors fill in gaps
in evidence by snaking inferences based on "scripts" that incorporate their world view); Kathryn
M. Ryan, Rape and Seduction Scripts, 12 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 237, 240-43 (1988) (documenting
rape "scripts" that describe women as more responsible for non-"classic" rapes).
152
 See People v. Brown, 883 P.2d 949, 958-59 (Cal. 1994) (explaining that fresh complaint
evidence is particularly important in this case where victim testifies to a series of alleged sexual
offenses over a considerable period of time, during which time she had opportunity to disclose
the offense but failed to do so, leaving the jury with an incomplete understanding of the victim's
behavior); State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 376 (NJ. 1990). In Hill, the complainant, M.K., was a
16•year-old resident of the Collier Group Home ("Collier") in Red Bank, a group residence for
"[yloung women who could not live with their families" run by New Jersey's Division of Youth
and Family Services. Hill, 578 A.2d at 371. The day of the assault, M.K. went to a party with the
defendant, where she drank beer, and others drank beer and smoked marijuana. Id. at 372.
During the evening when M.K. tried to find a bathroom, the defendant cornered her and raped
her. Id. M.K. did not tell anyone about the rape until approximately one month after the incident,
when another resident of Collier confided to M.K. that defendant had raped her. Id. Both girls
waited another week to go to the police. Id. at 373. Fresh complaint evidence admitted in Hill
demonstrated that M.K. did not simply wait to go to the police; like many rape complainants she
"tested the waters" in a confidential conversation with a girlfriend before going to the police. See
id.; see also Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1298 (D.C. 1982) (victim told friend before
reporting to police); Commonwealth v. Lanning, 589 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992)
(victim told aunt before reporting to police).
155
	 supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
154 Torrey, supra note 3, at 1050-51 n.185 (rigid beliefs can be altered by directly attacking
the beliefs in question).
155 See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JoHN's L.
REV. 979, 1013; supra notes 99-126 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF FRESH COMPLAINT EVIDENCE
Although the fresh complaint rule plays an important role in
sexual assault trials, it has significant detrimental effects. Despite the
evolving rationale and eroding freshness requirement, some harmful
effects remain.
The most profound negative aspect of the rule is that it may
reinforce the timing myth, both in individual rape trials and in the
legal community generally. Because the rule uses prompt complaints
to counteract the presumption underlying the timing myth, it validates
the bias of jurors who assume that promptness means veracity.'" For
jurors who would not ordinarily have noticed the absence of a prompt
complaint, the admission of fresh complaint evidence may empha-
size the collateral issue of the timing of the complaint to the jury.'"
Moreover, because the rule is a special exception for sexual assault
cases158 and permits admission of fresh complaint evidence before
impeachment, the rule suggests to jurors and to society as a whole
that sexual assault complainants are inherently unbelievable and in
need of a special rule to raise their credibility to a level attained by
other crime victims. 15" Indeed, the historical basis for the fresh com-
plaint rule is that female sexual assault victims are inherently unt-
rustworthy.'" The "hue and cry"-based rationale for the rule gives the
law's endorsement to the negative stereotypes of the rule and ensures
that the stereotypes will endure.'"' Terms such as "fresh complaint" and
156 See Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note I, Bienen Submission, at 3, 7; DuBois, supra note
3, at 1097-1109.
157 Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, Bienen Submission, at 4 (explaining that the
assumption jurors think or expect a rape victim to complain within a reasonable time may be
analogous to telling the boy not to put beans in his ear, when he never thought of doing so until
his mother told him not to).
158 In People v. Brown, the California Supreme Court found that in cases involving crimes
other than sex offenses, "it is common for evidence to be admitted describing how and when the
crime was reported by the victim, on the ground that such evidence is relevant to the determi-
nation of whether the offense occurred." 883 P.2d 949, 957 (Cal. 1994). The Brown court,
however, cited only three cases in which such evidence was admitted. Id. at 957-58.
169 This harmful byproduct of special treatment rules for a particular group has been a
controversy for feminist legal theorists. Compare Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 196-97 (1982) (reject-
ing special treatment model in favor of equality model because giving special legal treatment to
women reinforces sexual stereotypes) with Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1285 (1987) (law should recognize reality of women's difference and make
it "costless" by treating it like similar male characteristics).
180
 See Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, Bienen Submission, at 3, 5; Torrey, supra note
3, at 1042.
161 See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
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the freshness requirement contribute to the rule's myth reinforce-
ment.' 62
The evolving rationale for the rule and the eroding freshness
requirement eradicate some of the more troublesome parts of the rule,
but do not entirely cure its myth-reinforcing effects. Moreover, these
new elements of the rule make the rule doctrinally inconsistent. First,
although the evolving rationale performs the important function of
educating judges and attorneys about the powerful negative effect of
rape myths on sexual assault trials, the instruction to the jury does not
reflect this rationale. By telling the jury that "it would be natural for
you to assume that a person subjected to unlawful sexual act(s) would
complain within a reasonable time" and that "Ulf you heard no evi-
dence that [victim] made such a complaint, you might conclude that
no unlawful sexual act occurred,"' 63 the instruction directly reinforces
the timing myth—the very myth it seeks to correct. The instruction
does not refer to judicial concern over juror bias or belief in the timing
myth or other rape myths, which is the actual rationale for the rule.
Thus, the educational value of the rule is diminished significantly
because those who the evolving rationale presumes to be biased, the
jurors, are never educated about their bias.
Moreover, use of fresh complaint evidence by courts espousing the
evolving rationale is disingenuous. Use of fresh complaint evidence to
deal with the timing myth, instead of attacking the myth itself, rein-
forces the timing myth by linking freshness to veracity. In addition,
courts following the evolving rationale explicitly reject the notion that
freshness is relevant to veracity, yet require complaints to be fresh.' 64
Thus, the courts not only admit evidence they believe to be irrelevant,
but also do so in a way that reinforces the very stereotype they seek to
correct.' 65
 In fact, although the erosion of the freshness requirement
deemphasizes the relevance of freshness to veracity, the myth-reinforce-
ment of the rule endures because most courts continue to declare that
freshness is a prerequisite to admissibility and continue to use terms
like "fresh complaint."' 66
 Keeping the freshness requirement as part of
the legal rule gives the law's endorsement to the timing myth, even if,
162
 Fresh Complaint Heating, supra note 1, Bienen Submission, at 3, 5 (term "fresh complaint"
should be discarded as not only offensive and sexist, but also confusing and contradictory).
163 NJ. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 94, at 1.
164 0ne commentator describes the fresh complaint rule as "admitting irrelevant evidence to
rebut unfounded inferences that are premised upon unsupported assumptions." Colb, supra note
119, at 755 n.32.
165
 Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, Bienen Submission, at 7.
166 See id. at 3, 5; Torrey, supra note 3, at 1015.
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as a practical matter, freshness is not a real prerequisite of admissibility.
Substitution of a "reasonableness" requirement for freshness is also
problematic because it incorrectly presumes that there is a "reason-
able" reaction to sexual assault and that judges and jurors can recog-
nize it.'" Finally, because the theory of admissibility is that fresh com-
plaint evidence is necessary because of the widespread belief in the
timing myth, permitting admission of a significantly delayed prior
complaint may be more harmful than helpful.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PARADOX: TOWARD ACKNOWLEDGING
AND REMEDYING THE IMPACT OF RAPE MYTHS ON THE
CREDIBILITY OF SEXUAL ASSAULT COMPLAINANTS
The need exists for a rule that effectively deals with the timing
issue, especially in cases involving minors and complainants with rape-
myth based credibility problems. Fresh complaint evidence restores
credibility damage caused by the timing myth, and does so in cases
where timing may be a pivotal issue because of unfair skepticism about
the complainant's credibility stemming from rape stereotypes.' 68 The
rule, however, notwithstanding its evolution, has damaging side effects
that make it an imperfect solution.' 69 If we eliminate all versions of the
fresh complaint rule, however, how do we deal with the timing myth
and other rape myth-based credibility problems in individual sexual
assault trials?
A. Proposed Solutions
Because of the negative effects of the fresh complaint rule, many
commentators have urged abrogation of the rule.'" Recognizing the
need for evidence to counteract the timing myth, however, these corn-
167 See State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370,377 (N.J. 1990) (to be admissible, complaint must be made
within "reasonable" time), Far from showing a reasonable reaction to rape, the empirical data
supports the notion that there is no "normal" (i.e. reasonable) victim response to rape in terms
of the timing of the complaint. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Moreover, presumptions
about what is a "reasonable" response to rape gave us the traditional fresh complaint rule.
16.5 See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 150-62 and accompanying text.
1" See, e.g., Torrey, supra note 3, at 1042-45 (urging abolition of the rule because of its sexist
history and because courts' misapplication of it has fostered stereotypical, false beliefs about rape
complainants); DuBois, supra note 3, at 1107 (arguing that the rule's method of dealing with the
timing myth—by showing that a particular victim did complain promptly—actually promotes the
myth by giving the impression that the law considers prompt complaints more believable);
Kenmore, supra note 3, at 237-40 (arguing that Icliisparate treatment of victims in rape and
assault cases is analytically unjustifiable" and recommending admission of prompt complaint
evidence only when it satisfies a modified spontaneous utterance theory).
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mentators have proposed substitutes to the fresh complaint rule. The
proposed substitutes fall into four categories: (i) admission of fresh
complaint evidence under rules of evidence other than the fresh com-
plaint rule, such as narrative testimony, spontaneous utterance or as a
prior consistent statement after defense impeachment on timing;"' (ii)
a jury instruction directing the jury not to take timing into account in
assessing the credibility of the complainant; 12
 (iii) removing the issue
of timing from the case by prohibiting any testimony about when the
assault occurred and any complaints made;' 73
 and (iv) expert testimony
on rape trauma syndrome."' All of these methods are either impracti-
cal or less effective than fresh complaint evidence.
The first category of proposed substitutes, the "back door" admis-
sion of fresh complaint evidence, eliminates the opportunity to edu-
cate the legal community about rape myths using the evolving ration-
ale.'" Any opportunity to educate the legal community and jurors
about the timing myth and other rape myths is lost when evidence of
prior complaints is admitted without reference to these myths.'" In
addition, because it does not acknowledge that the prevalence of the
timing myth is the real reason fresh complaint evidence is necessary,
"back door" admission ignores and obscures the reality that sexual
assault complainants face unique obstacles to just adjudication of their
cases. 177
1711 call these the "back door" methods of admitting fresh complaint evidence, because
although the commentators who suggest them seem to want to preserve admissibility of fresh
complaint evidence because of its effect on the timing myth, under these methods that is not the
articulated rationale for admission of the evidence. See DuBois, supra note 3, at 1109-13 (sug-
gesting that fresh complaint evidence come in through narrative testimony, rehabilitation
through prior consistent statement, or spontaneous utterance); Fresh Complaint Hearings, supra
note 1, Bienen Submission, at 7 (agreeing with DuBois).
172
 Among the suggestions proposed by the Joint Subcommittee of the New Jersey Supreme
Court Committee on Criminal Practice and Rules of Evidence after the hearing on the utility of
fresh complaint evidence was an instruction directing the jury not to take timing into account
in assessing the credibility of the complainant. Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, at 49
(testimony of Julia L. McClure, Assistant Prosecutor, Middlesex County).
175
 The New Jersey Joint Subcommittee also suggested removing the issue of timing from the
case by prohibiting any testimony about when the assault occurred and when any complaints
were made. Id.
174 See State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 377 (N.J. 1990) (fresh complaint rule responds to jurors
with subtle biases or prejudices on their own terms).
175
 See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
1711 See DuBois, supra note 3, at 1110-11.
177 Cf. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Thx. L. REV.
387, 412 (1984) (commenting that changing statutory rape laws to criminalize exploitation of
male and female minors by adults avoids sexual stereotyping, but obscures issue of male sexual
aggression that is societal reality).
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Moreover, two of the back door substitutes, admission of fresh
complaint evidence through the spontaneous utterance or prior con-
sistent statement exceptions to the hearsay rule, do not respond to the
timing myth as effectively as the fresh complaint rule. Limiting admis-
sibility of fresh complaint evidence to spontaneous utterances would
effectively gut the rule—leaving the benefit of the rule to those who
need it least, those who complain immediately. Admitting fresh com-
plaint evidence only after defense impeachment ignores the possibility
that the credibility of sexual assault complainants may be damaged
before defense impeachment because of the circumstances of a given
case and rape mythology and its impact on timing. 178
The second category, giving the jury an instruction to disregard
timing, is ineffective and may be counterproductive. First, an instruc-
tion directing the jury not to consider the timing of the complaint or
the absence of fresh complaint in assessing the credibility of the com-
plainant is less effective than permitting the jury to hear information
about the complainant's behavior. 179
 Evidence of a prior complaint and
the circumstances under which the complainant made it will almost
always be far more compelling than a dry instruction, especially one
that instructs the jury to disregard evidence it may be predisposed to
consider.'" An instruction may also have the counterproductive effect
of piquing the jury's curiosity about prior complaints without satisfying
that curiosity.
The third category, removing timing evidence entirely from sexual
assault cases, is impractical and ignores the problem of jurors' drawing
inferences about the absence of fresh complaint evidence. 18 ' In many
cases, attempts to sanitize the record of all evidence of timing will not
only give a curious picture of events to the jury, who might be further
inclined to wonder about timing if that evidence is withheld, but also
may be impossible because of the sequence of events in a case. For
example, in State v. Devall, T.L. walked with Devall to a friend's apart-
ment after the alleged rape without screaming or crying out, lay down
in the friend's bedroom, and left only when Devall told her to leave. 18 "
1 " See supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
"9
 Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, Tr. at 50 (testimony of Judge Sylvia Pressler)
(noting that prosecution would almost always prefer a live witness to an instruction).
180 See .supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (explaining that cognitive inflexibility
causes people to cling to their beliefs even in face of contrary evidence). An instruction may
cause jurors to wonder why the evidence is being kept from them.
lkElFresh Complaint Heating, supra note 1, Tr. at 50 (testimony of Julia L. McClure, Assistant
Prosecutor, Middlesex County) (arguing with the Committee over whether an instruction is
inadequate because people have preconceptions of the relevance of timing).
182 State v. Devall, 489 N.W.2d 371,373 (S.D. 1992).
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These facts are not really evidence of the timing of T.L.'s complaint,
but nevertheless reveal a sequence of events that demonstrate to the
jury that T.L. did not complain at the first opportunity.'"
The fourth category, admission of expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome and the falsity of rape myths, although undoubtedly
the most effective way to counteract juror belief in rape myths, is simply
too expensive to be practical in every sexual assault trial where it is
necessary.' 84 In addition, controversy remains about the proper scope
of expert testimony.'" Expert testimony should certainly be used where
possible, but where it is not feasible, a need remains for evidence that
can counteract the timing myth for all sexual assault complainants.
B. A Modified Prior Complaint Rule
The most effective rule would include the analytical and practical
advantages of the fresh complaint rule and discard the doctrinally
troublesome parts of the rule. The goal of a modified rule would be
to continue the credibility-restoring function of fresh complaint while
expanding the myth-rejecting educational function of the evolving
rationale. In this way, the modified rule would ease the transition from
a point where fresh complaint evidence is vital to sexual assault prose-
cution to a point where it is unnecessary because society has been
educated about the danger of the timing myth and other rape myths.
First, following the lead of the Supreme Court of California, the
modified rule should explicitly eliminate the freshness requirement
and admit evidence of a sexual assault complainant's prior complaint
without a prerequisite of freshness or voluntariness. Without a prereq-
uisite of freshness, the terms "fresh complaint" or "prompt complaint"
no longer apply and should be replaced with a more neutral term such
as prior complaint or prior statement.'" There is no doctrinal reason
183 See id.; see also People v. Brown, 883 P.2d 949, 960 (Cal. 1994) (complainant testified to a
series of sexual offenses over a period of several years during which she did not disclose the
incidents).
I " See Fresh Complaint Hearing, supra note 1, Tr. at 5 (testimony of Carol Henderson, Deputy
Attorney General, Division of Criminal Justice and the Appellate Bureau).
183 See id. at 51-52 (testimony of Julia L. McClure, Assistant Prosecutor, Middlesex County)
(arguing with the Joint Subcommittee about the scope of expert testimony). See generally Karla
Fischer, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. Ray. 691, 693-94 (explaining the controversy over where to draw the
line to delineate the appropriate uses and scope of expert testimony); Patrick A. Frazier & Eugene
Borgida, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Case Law and Psychological Research, 16 Lew & Hum.
BEnAv. 293, 293 (1992) (noting that courts remain divided on the admissibility of expert testi-
mony); Serrato, supra note 100, at 156-57 (explaining expert testimony can both help and hinder
child sexual abuse prosecutions).
186 The Supreme Court of California uses the term "extrajudicial-complaint evidence." Brown,
883 P.2d at 959.
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for the freshness or voluntariness of a prior complaint to be a prereq-
uisite for admissibility, and there are affirmative reasons to eliminate
these requirements.'" Eliminating the freshness requirement is essen-
tial to eradicating the myth-reinforcing effects of the fresh complaint
rule because it ensures that the veracity of the complainant would no
longer be correlated to freshness and it diminishes the appearance that
the law accepts the truth of the timing myth.188
Although admission of delayed complaints may be harmful to the
prosecution because of the timing myth, the decision whether to use
the evidence should be made by the prosecutor on a case by case basis.
In some cases admission of a delayed complaint may be essential to
show both that the complainant was not silent and the circumstances
of her complaint. Without the evidence, the jury may be left with an
incomplete or erroneous understanding of the victim's behavior.'"
Evidence of prior complaints will be available in every sexual assault
case that proceeds to trial because complainants will have necessarily
made formal complaints and will likely have made other statements
prior to their formal complaints.'"
To further reduce the appearance that the law embraces rape
myths and to ensure education of the legal community about the harm
done by rape myths, courts should reject the "hue and cry" basis for
the rule and adopt the evolving rationale as the basis for the prior
complaint rule. In addition to educating the legal community, courts
should use the evolving rationale to instruct jurors about the purpose
of the prior complaint evidence to ensure that jurors are educated
about rape myths and shown that the law rejects rape myths. For
example, instead of instructing the jury "that the law recognizes that
it is natural for you to assume that a person subjected to unlawful
sexual act(s) would complain within a reasonable time,"' 9 ' the court
should tell the jurors that "the law recognizes that stereotypes about
187 1d.; WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1135, at 302-03 (noting that because the purpose of the
evidence is merely to negate the presumption of the complainant's silence, the fact of complaint
at any time should be received).
188 See supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
I" Brown, 883 P.2d at 958-59.
l'it'Although many complainants delay going to the police, one study found that 41% of
complainants who eventually reported to the police discussed the rape with someone else first.
GREENBERG & RUBACK, supra note 99, at 138-40. In that study of rape victims in Atlanta, 92% of
victims who did not immediately report to the police, but eventually reported, confided in
someone else, such as a friend, spouse or family member, first. Id. at 140. In another study in
Pittsburgh, 78% of victims who eventually reported confided in someone else first. Id. at 154; see
also Mary Kay Biaggio et al., Reporting and Seeking Support by Victims of Sexual Offenses, 17 (1/2)
J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 35, 34 (1991) (stating that research indicates from one-half to
two-thirds of sexually assaulted adults discuss their experiences with someone else).
191 See N.J. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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sexual assault and sexual assault complainants may lead some of you
to question or focus on whether the complainant made a prior com-
plaint. To ensure that you do not unfairly judge the complainant's
credibility because you believe that he/she did not make a prior com-
plaint, the State is permitted to offer evidence that the complainant
did make a prior complaint."
In light of the purpose of the prior complaint evidence and its
admission before defense impeachment, fairness requires that the evi-
dence continue to be admitted for a narrow credibility purpose and
not as substantive evidence that the sexual assault occurred.' 92 Al-
though the distinction between substantive and credibility evidence is
a difficult one, the rationale for admitting prior consistent statements
after impeachment on cross-examination does not exist for prior com-
plaint evidence because at the time of admission of prior complaint
evidence, the adverse party has not yet "opened the door." 193 Moreover,
courts should continue to restrict the number of witnesses permitted
to testify about prior complaints and should give a limiting instruction
that clearly explains the proper use of the evidence.'"These safeguards
should minimize the risk that the jury will rely on the evidence for an
improper purpose. 195
Additionally, courts should conduct a rigorous case by case review
of fresh complaint evidence for undue prejudice, confusion and repe-
tition. 196 Courts should be especially cautious about the number of
witnesses permitted to testify about a complainant's prior statements.
In only the exceptional case will more than one witness be necessary.
To ensure fairness to the defense, the complainant should be available
for cross-examination on prior statements.
The modified rule is not a perfect solution. It continues some of
the negative aspects of the fresh complaint rule, such as the treatment
of the testimony of sexual assault complainants as inherently suspect.
Nevertheless, it is an appropriate interim rule that helps restore the
credibility of sexual assault complainants while moving toward elimi-
nation of the rule by educating judges, attorneys and jurors about rape
myths.
192 See Brown, 883 P.2d at 959.
193 See FED. R. Evil:). 801(d)(1) (A) advisory committee's note.
194 For an example of such an instruction, sec supra note 95 and accompanying text,
195 See Brown, 883 P.2d at 959.
195 Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The prevalence and power of rape myths in sexual assault trials
make sexual assault unique among crimes. Its victims have historically
suffered from unfair judgment and distrust, resulting in widespread
hesitance to report the crime. A special rule that restores the credibility
of sexual assault complainants is not only practical and analytically
justifiable, but also necessary. The modified prior complaint rule will
help sexual assault complainants as it educates jurors, judges and
attorneys about the power and prevalence of rape myths with the
ultimate goal of abrogation of the rule. When society becomes edu-
cated about the danger and falsity of rape myths, the rule will no longer
be necessary. Abrogation of the fresh complaint rule before then,
however, would ignore the reality that sexual assault complainants face
unique societal obstacles that impede just adjudication of their cases.
Until the credibility of sexual assault complainants is judged fairly and
without bias, complete abrogation of a rule that serves a distinct and
necessary purpose in sexual assault litigation is premature.
